Navigating Xinjiang:
Pakistan’s Strategy in Balancing Security and Diplomacy with China
June 9, 2022
China has long linked the Uyghur conflicts and skirmishes in Xinjiang as part of a broader ethnnationalist violence movement with ties to external terrorist organisations such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement [ETIM], the Pakistani Taliban and, to an extent, Al-Qaeda (Iwanek, 2019; Millward, 2014; 2019). Although no official linkage has been proven, there are still concerns within the Xi Jinping administration that Pakistan harbours Xinjiang refugees and ETIM members despite Pakistani efforts to aid Chinese security concerns (Iwanek, 2019). As a Pakistani policy adviser, I advise for closer cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] to ensure security on the Pakistan-Xinjiang border and to continue to crack down on pro-Xinjiang elements in Pakistan. We should be aware that some internal actors within Pakistan are sympathetic to the Xinjiang cause (Yusuf, 2020). Pakistan has also recieved international criticism for being complicit in China’s repression of the Uyghurs (Maina, 2021). We should also, however, be aware that maintaining positive diplomatic ties with China is crucial in pursuing our economic priorities in the region such as the Belt and Road Initiative (Small, 2017). Thus, it is paramount that Pakistan aids China’s efforts in counter-terrorism in Xinjiang while also simultaneously balancing internal unrest in Pakistan.
Balancing Challenges and Opportunities in China-Pakistan Relations and the CPEC
China has a long-standing relationship with Pakistan, where the potentially lucrative China-Pakistan Economic Corridor [CPEC] faces threats from Uyghur unrest and militant groups in the region (Hussain, 2017). Xinjiang is a geopolitically significant area, where massive domestic, regional and international investments are being channelled into the resource-rich region, facilitating profitable cross-border trade, transnational interconnected power grids in and around the region, and not least of all the CPEC (Huang et al., 2018; Rippa, 2019).
As the flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the $46 billion CPEC needs to be our primary objective in terms of economic development and investment, considering that trade and investment has been one of our weaker links in the China-Pakistan relationship (Small, 2017). Increased militancy along our border with Xinjiang, however, has lead to security questions over the project and our ability to handle these conflicts (Basit, 2019). Security threats from China-hostile separatists and sectarian militants along the Pakistan-Xinjiang border raises concerns from our Chinese counterparts on the possibility of instability seeping into Xinjiang (Basit, 2019). There are many external factors that complicate the CPEC, such as the repercussions for the constriction of CPEC infrastructure on our border with Afghanistan, which means competing with India for friendly Afghanistan relations in the wake of American military withdrawal (Hussain, 2017).
Instability and militancy is a significant factor that can severely damage our relationship with China and any potential economic investments. Counter-terrorism along the Xinjiang border is then clear as being our primary objective.
The Uyghur Challenge in Xinjiang and China’s Security Concerns
Terror attacks in recent years in Xinjiang, such as the Urumqi train station attack in 2017, strengthens China’s public position that the Uyghurs are receptive to ethnonationalist religious violence (Millward, 2014). Appleby (2000) defines ethnonationalist or ethnoreligious violence as a form of religious militance where religion is not at the centre of religious violence, but rather used as a tool to legitimise violence to achieve a greater ideology of a nation-state or ethnic group. According to the United Nations Security Council (2011), ETIM is closely associated with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban through funding and training with the aim of establishing an independent ‘East Turkestan’, setting up bases in neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan to train terrorists and execute terror attacks against Chinese targets domestically and abroad. ETIM has become a significant actor in voicing Uyghur plights abroad whilst also aligning themselves more closely to the jihad global movement advocated by groups like Al-Qaeda, presenting a threat of greater extremism and radicalisation of those representing the Uyghur Muslims (Pereire, 2006). The current Taliban government in Afghanistan has explicitly stated that they do not allow Uyghurs to join their ranks and will not interfere with Chinese ‘internal affairs’, assuring them ETIM will not revive in Afghanistan (Trofimov, 2021). It is then the best course of action to also assure China that ETIM will not resurface in Pakistan.
Balancing Post-Secular Language in Pakistan-China Relations
So far, we have utilised post-secular language to achieve our diplomatic goals with China. Noorul Haq Qadri, the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony, discussed the possibility of cooperation between religious scholars from both Pakistan and China with the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Yao Xing, in 2018, with an emphasis on people-to-people relations and furthering bilateral ties at a religious level (Hussain, 2018). The current constructivist post-secular approach to our foreign policy with China leans heavily on faith-based diplomacy. It allows us to influence Islamic thinking and the appropriate Sunni madhhab in China through their state apparatus, which Mavelli and Petito (2012) argues to be a key advantage in conducting post-secular international relations. With a dedication to Islamic rationality, however, comes the contradiction where we ignore the morality and intuition of being Muslims and to help the Uyghurs, being at odds with what Tadjbakhsh (2010) describes as Islamic international relations theory. While our current approach may work in other contexts, our refusal to help the Uyghurs has produced discontent in our own population, in which both Urdu and English media in Pakistan has helped fuel public outcry and in turn upset our Chinese counterparts (Sibal 2020; Yusuf, 2020). Seeing the possible hypocrisy in our public stance to Xinjiang, it may be best to prioritise the use of secular language instead of post-secular language to avoid this issue altogether, creating a more friendly environment for us to achieve our goals.
Conclusion
We must place economic cooperation and partnership with China as our most important objective, even at the cost of being complicit to the Chinese repression of Uyghurs. The best way to achieve that is through closer cooperation of transnational counter-terrorism strategies, where ensuring that no pro-Xinjiang or pro-Uyghur elements exist in Pakistan is a prerequisite. Ultimately, we must avoid the issue of Uyghurs and Islam in general when publicly discussing Chinese-Pakistani relations. The likely barrier to success for this preferred approach would be increased hostility by militant groups on the Xinjiang border, considering the potential absence of any discussion of Uyghur human rights abuses and religious relations more broadly. However, once we do manage to suppress any pro-Uyghur militant groups on the Xinjiang border, the rewards will outweigh the costs.
References
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Originally submitted as coursework for the Bachelor of Arts, University of Melbourne
The Perantau 