ASEAN’s Role in the Security of the Korean Peninsula
June 14, 2021
The presence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] has grown beyond the borders of Southeast Asia and has increasingly taken an active role in the politics of neighbouring regions. Institutional tools have been put into place to facilitate defence dialogue and cooperation between East Asian and Southeast Asian nations, positioning it in the strategic framework of what the former defines as national security (Almonte 1997, p. 80).
Despite certain setbacks, ASEAN’s normalised bilateral ties with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [North Korea] and the Republic of Korea [South Korea], as well as their historically neutral and impartial stance towards inter-Korean relations, opens the possibility for ASEAN to embody some role in the politics of the Korean peninsula (Bae & De Bruyn 2020, p. 60).
This paper will focus on to what extent ASEAN plays a role in the security of the Korean peninsula, guided by three sub-questions:
a) what stance has ASEAN taken on the North Korea nuclear issue?;
b) what has been the effect of the cooperative security agreements between ASEAN and South Korea?;
c) how has ASEAN acted as an intermediary between the two Koreas?
Literature Review
This paper lends on existing literature on international relations theory, but also on how it applies to ASEAN’s security role in the Korean peninsula. Liberalism and social constructivism sets the context o ASEAN’s behaviour in general but also their approach to inter-Korean relations, where the former is defined by Kant (1917, p. 113) as that the sovereignty of a nation should hold precedence to ensure peace while applying Nye’s (2004, p.5) concept of soft power as co-opting instead of coercing, essentially building peace by leading as an example. Similarly, the latter theory leans on Wendt’s (1999, p. 135) explanation on how the state is driven by identities, ideas and interests; how cultural phenomena presupposes why states act the way they do.
These theories still hold importance, especially in the context of ASEAN and ASEAN values.
Nah (2017, p. 69) discusses ASEAN’s general perspective on nuclear weapons and The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone [SEANWFZ], which echoes EW Tan, Govindasamy and Park’s (2015, p. 177) analysis of the ‘ASEAN Way’, which are the principles of non-intervention and consensus decision making. Bae and de Bruyn (2020, p. 62) expand on how ASEAN values and the SEANWFZ have been applied to their approach on dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons. This is not to disregard the importance of ASEAN-led cooperative security agreements and platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF] and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus [ADMM-Plus]. Almonte (1997, p. 80) and MH Tan (2017, p. 312) both analyse how the ARF has been the most effective way to facilitate inter-Korean relations, where similarly Lee (2016, p. 121) analyses the effect of the ADMM-Plus and how it can work alongside the ARF. However, Ballbach (2017, p. 57) provides a different perspective where although the ARF has been a breakthrough in inter-Korean talks, he also criticises its ineffectiveness in pressuring North Korea. Considering ASEAN’s capability, Ngoc (2020, p. 127) suggests that even though ASEAN-led initiatives have faced limitations in the past, there is still much potential for ASEAN to be an effective intermediary between North Korea and South Korea.
ASEAN’s Nuanced Approach: Navigating North Korea’s Nuclear Challenge
ASEAN is strongly against North Korea’s nuclear possessions and promotes non-proliferation ideals, however, unlike the rest of the world, they do not use coercive measures to combat North Korea.
The SEANWFZ (1995) as per Article 3(1a) obligates ASEAN member states to not “develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons”, which applies to the territories and Exclusive Economic Zone of the State Parties. Nah (2017, p. 69) argues that the possible intended effect is to lessen the possibility of being intimidated or coerced by nuclear powers, but also to prevent other ASEAN member states to become a nuclear power or interventionist hegemon. The treaty acts as a rejection of self-help for individual survival and instead embraces ideals of interdependence and mutual trust in security.
As a multilateral institution, ASEAN’s policy towards the North Korea nuclear issue combines liberalism and social constructivist thought. Kant’s (1917, p. 113) democratic peace theory echoes Article 1.3.1 of the ASEAN-Republic of Korea Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Vision Statement for Peace, Prosperity and Partnership ([ASEAN-RoK PoA] 2020), which aims to “[s]trengthen cooperation in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology in a safe and secure manner … to reinforce the regional non-proliferation regime.”
This aligns with Nye’s (2004, p. 5) theory on soft power, as ASEAN’s approach is seen in a way that is not confrontational but rather emphasising that through mutual cooperation can they achieve the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, this is not devoid of ASEAN ideas and interests, wherein this situation sets the precursor to the aforementioned approach.
Wendt’s (1999, p. 135) social constructivism aligns with ASEAN’s founding philosophy, the ‘ASEAN Way’, as it places an approach to diplomacy based on “personal ties, trust, consultation and consensus”, reflecting their ‘non-aligned’ desire in international politics, which, in turn, was a result of political tensions regarding the sovereignty of Southeast Asian countries during the Cold War period (Tan, EW, Govindasamy & Park 2015, p. 177).
This may be a reason why although ASEAN supports United Nations [UN] sanctions on North Korea, they still continue to trade with the country (Bae & De Bruyn 2020, p. 62); as of November 2016, ASEAN (2016) reported exports to North Korea was at $159.3 million USD and imports from North Korea $25 million USD.
Other multilateral institutions such as the European Union and the UN Security Council have attempted to use incentives and coercive measures like sanctions on North Korea out of fear (Bae & De Bruyn 2020, p. 58). ASEAN does not take this approach, as according to liberalism and social constructivist theory, they place priority on engaging in peaceful dialogue through mutual cooperation between them and North Korea.
Thus, although ASEAN is strongly against North Korea’s possession of a nuclear arsenal, they do not, however, wish to use force or other coercive measures to achieve this goal.
ASEAN and South Korea’s Collaborative Approach to Peace
ASEAN and South Korea’s cooperation through ASEAN-led cooperative security agreements has made it possible for both actors to ensure non-aggressive security measures in the Korean peninsula, increasing the chances for a non-hostile North Korea.
The ARF plays a key role for South Korea to engage with North Korea, as not only is it one of the few platforms with North Korean membership, it is also more conducive as a platform for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue and the potential denuclearisation of North Korea, as opposed to other platforms such as the Six-Party Talks (Almonte 1997, p. 80; Tan, MH 2017, p. 317). The nature of the ARF is a cooperative security regime, and since the ASEAN-led initiative follows the ‘ASEAN-Way’, the ARF practices the non-interference in the domestic affairs of another nation and consensus-based decision making (Almonte 1997, p. 80; Tan, MH 2017, p. 312).
This is addressed in several articles of the ASEAN-RoK PoA (2020), as for example Article 1.1.1 states that political cooperation between the two entities aims to “[s]trengthen cooperation in ASEAN-led regional processes and arrangements … to promote peace, stability, security, development and prosperity in the region,” and later emphasising in Article 1.2.1 that security cooperation should “promote conflict prevention and resolution, preventive diplomacy and conflict management to enhance peace, security and stability in the region.”
South Korea’s commitment to the use of soft power, as dictated by ASEAN, is solidified when South Korea acceded ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia [TAC] in 2004, where the TAC (1976) emphasises the commitment to the mutual respect of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.
Similar to the ARF, the ADMM-Plus has also played a role in allowing ASEAN to participate in the security of the Korean peninsula. Despite the ADMM only being established in 2006 and its extension ADMM-Plus which includes 8 other nations established in 2010, it has since emphasised its role as “the de-facto multilateral mechanism for defence cooperation in the ASEAN-centred regional architecture to strengthen and give new momentum for existing ASEAN-led mechanisms” (ADMM-Plus 2020).
For example, in a speech by South Korea’s Minister of Defence (2020) in the 2020 ADMM-Plus, attention was given on creating peace and prosperity in the Korean peninsula through cooperation and mutual security with the ASEAN member states. This affirms South Korea’s commitment as outlined in the defence agreements of the ASEAN-RoK PoA (2020, Art. 1.4.1), as to “enhance defence dialogue and practical cooperation through the ARF and ADMM-Plus.”
The inclusion of other major powers in ADMM-Plus, such as China, India and Russia, represents a key strength of the regional framework because of its ability to bring together small, middle and great powers (Lee 2016, p. 188), similar in effect with the ARF.
In resolving conflict or reducing military tensions, both the ARF and ADMM-Plus compliments each other, where the former brings foreign ministers on broad security issues and the latter brings defense ministers on specific security cooperation (Lee 2016, p. 121).
South Korea’s commitment and participation of ASEAN-led cooperative security agreements have in effect allowed South Korea to pursue their own interests in regional security, whilst ASEAN doing their part in orchestrating multilateral talks.
Fostering Inter-Korean Relations: ASEAN’s Role in Diplomacy and Dialogue
ASEAN has shown their capabilities to facilitate inter-Korean relations, however their inability to pressure North Korea highlights their ineffectivity.
South Korea’s Moon administration have placed greater importance on ASEAN taking a more proactive role as an intermediary between North Korea and the rest of the world, where this trust in promoting dialogue with North Korea stems from all of the ASEAN member state’s commitment to the SEANWFZ and eight of which have North Korean embassies (Ngoc 2020, p. 120).
According to the Chairman’s Statement of the 2020 ARF (ARF 2020, para. 9), all ministers were in agreement of sustained and peaceful dialogue while expecting the “full and expeditious implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and the Joint Statement by the Leaders of the United States and the DPRK.” Furthermore, the ministers supported South Korea’s advancement of inter-Korean dialogue, whilst emphasising the important role ASEAN-led platforms such as the ARF “in promoting a conducive atmosphere to peaceful dialogue amongst the concerned parties” (ARF 2020, para. 9).
However, although the ARF has been praised for being a primary channel for inter-Korean dialogue, there has also been criticism of its effectiveness.
Ballbach (2017, p. 57) argues that the very characteristics in which it has been conducive for North Korea to participate are the same reasons why the platform has not made much impact. The ARF’s, and more widely ASEAN’s, low institutionalisation structure warrants the principles of non-interference of domestic affairs and consensus decision making, which has satisfied North Korea’s reason of ARF membership but consequently has not been conducive in addressing contentious issues and extensive discussions on denuclearisation, in part due to reluctance to provoke North Korea (Ballbach 2017, p. 57). Despite this, it is also unrealistic to expect the immediate denuclearisation of North Korea, especially considering that the ARF is the only international platform that North Korea regularly participates in.
Ngoc (2020, p. 127) has suggested that ASEAN and South Korea should cooperate as it has in the past few years in building a peace agenda and dialogues of mutual understanding with North Korea. The ARF has consistently been proven as the most effective way in approaching North Korea. In the 20 different ARF-sponsored activities and meetings between 2003-2014, North Korea’s average participation is just under 35%, which accounts to an average of 7 meetings annually (Ballbach 2017, p. 50). Likewise, the ARF has also regularly assisted informal bilateral contacts between North Korea and other countries (Ballbach 2017, p. 60).
Thus, although ASEAN has not acted as a direct intermediary between North and South Korea, it is the platforms such as the ARF that has allowed the development of not only inter-Korean relations, but also facilitates the involvement of other stakeholders of the Korean peninsula.
Conclusion
ASEAN has laid the foundation to actively participate in security talks in the Korean peninsula. Their clear emphasis on North Korea’s denuclearisation through soft power has satisfied both North Korea and South Korea; the former because of the non-intervention ideals of ASEAN, and the latter because this has been the most effective to host peaceful dialogue with their northern counterparts (Tan, EW, Govindasamy & Park 2015, p. 177; Tan, MH 2017, p. 312). ASEAN-led cooperative security agreements and platforms such as the ARF, and to a lesser extent the ADMM-Plus, have been key examples of ASEAN’s security role in hosting multilateral talks (Lee 2016, p. 121). However, ASEAN’s effectiveness has been criticised, where their ideals of non-intervention and consensus decision-making have been aspects that hinder dialogue with tangible or immediate outcomes (Ballbach 2017, p. 57). As a security partner with the two Koreas, ASEAN has achieved goals no other multilateral institution has. There is still much potential for ASEAN to realise their capabilities, but their security role in the Korean peninsula should not be underestimated.
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Originally submitted as coursework for the Bachelor of Arts, University of Melbourne
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