Strategic Partnerships for Peace:
Assessing China’s Role in Korean Peninsula Diplomacy
April 15, 2021
Hostilities between the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) are caused by the historical desire for reunification of the Korean peninsula but without compromise from either government. Achieving peace in the peninsula means inter-Korean cooperation without reunification by minimising coercive hard power diplomacy and instead emphasising soft power diplomacy. Being North Korea’s sole security guarantor and largest trade partner, China is in a position to shift North Korea to a more conciliatory state and assist South Korea in continuing peaceful negotiations (Guidetti 2014, p. 113). This paper argues that even though tensions between China and the two Korean states remain high, China remains South Korea’s most strategic partner to achieve peace in the Korean peninsula because of China’s relatively positive relations with North Korea and China’s own interests in pursuing stability through peace in the Korean peninsula.
China-North Korea Relations: Historical Strengths and Future Developments
Despite recent conflicts, China’s bilateral relations with North Korea has been historically strong and one that is continuously developing. Kim Jong Un’s priority in developing nuclear weapons and showing strength by threatening to attack South Korea and firing artillery rounds in the disputed maritime border has invited international attention and condemnation, which opposes China’s desire for stability and a weakening presence of the United States (US) in East Asia (Pak 2020, p. 2). Despite China’s open support of United Nation sanctions, China’s imports from North Korea did not decrease in practice and has since maintained, even improved, economical and political ties with North Korea (Kim 2017, p. 166-169). Even after North Korea’s fifth nuclear test, China was eager to continue improving bilateral relations and vice versa with North Korea (Kim 2017, p. 173). Evidently, both China and North Korea are eager to maintain and further develop bilateral relations.
China’s normal relations with North Korea is best situated in the context that no other country maintains as strong of a bilateral relation. China has significant leverage over North Korea, but chooses not to act on it to let the North Korean issue be the international focus and undermine the US’s position in Asia. This is why China has so often tolerated North Korea’s volatile behaviour, why they rarely criticise North Korea’s provocations, and why they often side with the North Korean position in the ‘Six Party Talks’ (Nanto & Manyin 2010, p. 4). Seeing that China has no intention to harm North Korea unlike the rest of the world, a realist perspective shows North Korea to be more willing to follow China’s guidance, akin to the ‘lips and teeth’ constructivist rhetoric prevalent during the Korean War. This rhetoric emphasises an angle on soft power diplomacy; coopting North Korea by placing value in culture and their shared history as well. Normalcy in Sino-North Korean relations allows for peace talks to resume.
Although China shows interest in pursuing stability in the Korean peninsula, it is important to note that China does not want the reunification of the two Korean states. China wants to preserve the existence of North Korea because if not, China will lose a crucial buffer state between them and US allies (Kim 2017, p. 174). China maintains a realist decision to sustain an erratic North Korea that is stable and friendly rather than a dangerous North Korea angered at China or alternatively the power vacuum caused by the collapse of the country (Kim 2017, p. 175). Considering China’s and North Korea’s already existing improvements of bilateral ties through but not limited to economic cooperation, infrastructure development, and sport and cultural exchanges continue to stabilise North Korea (Snyder & Byun 2019, p. 86), potentially creating a more reasonable climate should peace talks in the Korean peninsula resume.
Sino-South Korean Relations in a Shifting Landscape
Similar to North Korea, Sino-South Korean relations have been equally contentious, as on the one hand, South Korea and China have established a ‘strategic cooperative partnership’, yet on the other, both sides have difficulty cooperating on regional issues (Chung 2012, p. 224). As a result of North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, South Korea deployed THAAD in 2016, the U.S. missile defence system as a defence measure, which consequently has deteriorated relations with China as China perceives it as a threat to national interests and security (Pak 2020, p. 3). South Korea’s relations with the US has become a deterrent to China’s influence in the peninsula, consequently hindering regional partnerships. However, the Moon Jae-in administration’s policy toward inter-Korean cooperation has become the backbone to restrengthen the bond between South Korea and China (Lee & Cho 2018, p. 125). South Korea sees China’s influence in North Korea as a path to make them more open to engaging in dialogue, more agreeable to inter-Korean cooperation and willing to improve bilateral ties (Guidetti 2014, p. 114). Thus through talks on inter-Korean cooperation, China and South Korea sees similar interests, which makes both sides more willing to cooperate.
The Moon administration’s liberalist view on inter-Korean cooperation, which then dictates foreign policy, is a shifting mindset on South Korea’s approach to achieving peace in the Korean peninsula. A liberalist view tends to approach these situations while not considering the role of power, which is why inter-Korean cooperation has not been realised. However, Moon’s liberalist approach if assisted by China should be a catalyst to progress. Considering China’s pro-North Korean stance in the Six Party Talks and their realist approach to the North Korea issue, Moon’s strong focus on inter-Korean relations leads to a path of normalising relations with Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un, which in turn is effective to stabilise Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula (Snyder & Byun 2019, p. 86). North Korea’s bandwagon behaviour with China as the rising threat provides South Korea with an opportunity to pursue inter-Korean economic interdependence and cultural exchanges.
Conclusion
The stabilisation and potentially more friendly North Korea caused by Chinese efforts will likely see the gradual weakening of reasons for the US to station troops in South Korea, going back to China’s realist view on their foreign policy. This scenario would yield a South Korea that shifts from the US sphere of influence to the Chinese. Consequently, the platform for multi-lateral talks between China, North Korea and South Korea will be more effective, especially considering Moon’s policy on inter-Korean cooperation. Peace in the Korean peninsula will take the form of what China has done with North Korea in the past few years, such as economic and cultural diplomacy. For South Korea, this version of achieving peace has seen progress such as that of an inter-Korean railway project in the North Korean city of Kaesong, creating a new process of regional integration as outlined by the Moon-Kim dialogue and Moon’s ‘New Northern Policy’, which has also received commendations from China (Snyder & Byun 2019, p. 88). Though tangible steps towards peace are yet to be properly realised, South Korea can depend on China.
China is by no means a perfect candidate for South Korea’s most strategic regional partner to achieve peace in the Korean peninsula. However, China is positioned as the most ideal actor, especially in terms of reigning in North Korea to engage in peaceful dialogue and inter-Korean cooperation with South Korea. An erratic Kim Jong-un has seen to increasingly embrace Xi Jinping in recent years, creating the opportunity for Moon Jae-in to achieve peace in the Korean peninsula. The increasing likelihood of normalising relations amongst China, North Korea and South Korea, and the current overlapping of interests between all parties, situate China as South Korea’s most strategic regional partner to achieve peace in the Korean peninsula.
References
Chung, JH 2012, ‘Korean Views of Korea-China Relations: Evolving Perceptions and Upcoming Challenges’, Asian Perspective vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 219-236.
Guidetti, A 2014, ‘South Korea and China: A Strategic Partnership in the Making’, Global Asia, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 110-115.
Kim, JU 2017, ‘Pseudo Change: China’s Strategic Calculations and Policy Toward North Korea after Pyongyang’s 4th Nuclear Test’, East Asia, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 163-178.x
Lee, SW & Cho, HJ 2018, ‘A Subtle Difference between Russia and China’s Stances toward the Korean Peninsula and Its Strategic Implications for South Korea’, Journal of International and Area Studies, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 113-130.
Nanto, DK & Manyin ME 2010, ‘China-North Korea Relations’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress.
Pak, JH November 2020, ‘China’s Gambit on the Korean Peninsula’, Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition EAI Working Paper.
Snyder, S & Byun, SW 2019, ‘China Reaffirms Tradition: DPRK Friendship and Recovery of South Korean Ties’, Comparative Connections, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 83-91.
Originally submitted as coursework for the Bachelor of Arts, University of Melbourne
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