The Perantau

Online and Offline Power Struggles:

A Case Study of Indonesia’s Omnibus Law on Job Creation Protests

Indonesia’s controversial Omnibus Law on Job Creation, passed in October 2020, aims to simplify bureaucracy and attract investment but faces significant opposition (Ghaliya & Gorbiano, 2020). Critics, including labor unions and environmentalists, argue it undermines labor rights and environmental protections by prioritising business interests instead (Ghaliya & Gorbiano, 2020).

The Indonesian public have sought to use social media to facilitate online discourse and organise campaigns, which has translated to many physical protests nation-wide that reflected widespread discontent, demanding the law’s cancellation (Lane, 2020).

Simultaneously, however, the same affordances that facilitate the Indonesian digital public sphere also allows for pro-government actors to flood the online space with pro-government rhetoric, mostly fueled through concerted campaigns by coordinated attacks from bots and buzzers (Mufti & Rasidi, 2021; Sastramidjaja & Rasidi, 2021).

Indonesia boasts one of the world’s largest internet markets, comprising 213 million internet users in 2023, the majority of whom rely on the internet for information (WeAreSocial & Meltwater, 2023). A significant 73% of Indonesian internet users are active online, frequently using platforms like Twitter and WhatsApp for communication and sharing news with their vast network (WeAreSocial & Meltwater, 2023).

In light of Indonesia’s substantial online presence and the contentious debates surrounding the Omnibus Law – and considering Indonesia’s history of having both civil society and the state grapple for power on social media to influence public opinion (see Johansson, 2016; Rakhmani & Permana, 2020; Sadasri, 2020; Seto, 2019; Titifanue et al., 2020) – this essay illustrates how online and offline protests against the Omnibus Law showcase the fragility of online discourse, and how it opens avenues for information manipulation.

Literature Review

Digital Politics, Social Media and Room for Manipulation

In negotiating the role of power and knowledge, we look at Foucault’s (1978) coinage of ‘power/knowledge’. The intricate relationship between power and knowledge as intertwined and mutually reinforcing, where power both relies on and shapes knowledge and thus produces reality and truth, often leading to the legitimation of certain groups’ interests and the marginalisation of others. Building on Foucault (1978), Deleuze (1990) argues that as contemporary societies transition from disciplinary societies to societies of control, control mechanisms are replacing traditional forms of discipline in various institutions that involves continuous surveillance and regulation, leading to the emergence of new forms of domination (Deleuze, 1990).

This requires a closer look at Habermas’s (1974) definition of the public sphere – a space where ordinary citizens, representing civil society, gather freely to discuss matters of general interest to shape public opinion while bridging the gap between society and the state. Hoskins (2014) offers a more contemporary view, particularly how social media has enabled the public sphere in new and emerging democracies. Social media platforms enable both offline and online protests, providing a space for open discourse directed at a broad audience, facilitating information dissemination, blurring the lines between private and public, and offering an alternative to conventional and sensationalist media in emerging democracies (Hoskins, 2014).

Wolfson (2014, p. 4) argues that with social movements increasingly influenced by digital technologies and the global economy, we should also consider that technological tools “are produced and reproduced with social intention by those with power”. As such, the illusion of democratising online discourse also affords larger participation on online discourse, regardless if they represent actual people or are fake, automated accounts. For the former, Senft (2008) defines microcelebrities as people who construct well-defined, branded personas online, in that they differ to celebrities more broadly by having a smaller reach but are have greater influence in their niche following. With the latter, Ferrara et al. (2016) argues that social bots – algorithms that mimic human behavior on social media – can be harmful when used to mislead, exploit, and manipulate social media discourse with various forms of misinformation and manipulation. The challenge with bots is not just the accuracy of information but their ability to create a false impression of popularity and influence (Ferrara et al., 2016).

Andrejevic (2020) contends that contemporary political campaigning leverages voter databases and data collection, resulting in information overload, including deceptive content. The lines between politics, data mining, and media manipulation are increasingly blurred, challenging traditional democracy (Andrejevic, 2020). Hassan and Sutherland (2016) echoes this sentiment, arguing that digital politics and online political activism have not led to a positive transformation in human affairs, asserting that digitalisation amplifies flaws in politics, contributing to a constant state of postmodern political stasis, where online activism disconnects from ethical and temporal realities and has limited influence on societal progress.
The evolution from disciplinary societies to societies of control, mediated by both traditional media and social media, poses multifaceted challenges to the ideal of the public sphere, where genuine discourse and participation grapple with the influence of technological tools and automated actors, blurring the boundaries between real and fabricated engagement.

The Indonesian Context

As Lim (2017) suggests in her study on algorithmic enclaves and the rise of tribal nationalism in Indonesia, social media platforms have become deeply ingrained in various aspects of Indonesian society, which has sparked hope for the rise of political involvement and civic participation as it amplifies the permeability of information dissemination. As Johansson (2016) echoes in his study on the role of social media in Indonesian politics, these new avenues for two-way communication, especially between government and the public, has made social media closely intertwined with the realm of Indonesian politics, making it a crucial area of contestation that can influence policymaking and national governance. While the impact and involvement of microcelebrities in influencing Indonesian politics are not to be underestimated (see Rakhmani & Permana, 2020; Sadasri, 2020), it may be more beneficial to focus on the role of ‘buzzers’. According to Indonesia’s Centre for Innovation Policy and Governance (Camil, Attamimi & Esti, 2017), buzzers are social media accounts used to amplify messages by attracting attention to or creating a ‘buzz’ on certain issues, are persuasive in nature and has a wide social network, most often fueled by financial incentives from their ‘employer’.

In recent years, social media has played a significant role in both democratic and non-democratic discourse. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Indonesian microcelebrities and influencers were strategically employed by the government to disseminate official policies and maintain a positive public image (Rakhmani & Permana, 2020; Sadasri, 2020). These influencers aligned closely with government directives, promoting cooperation and a “culture of clean and healthy living” (Sadasri, 2020, p. 68).

On the other hand, grassroots movements like the Free West Papua movement have used social media to voice their concerns in response to human rights abuses and political suppression (Titifanue et al., 2020). Using hashtags like #freewestpapua, local civil society took to Twitter to reach a broader regional and international audience (Titifanue et al., 2020). An investigation by the Pacific Media Watch (2019), however, found that the Indonesian police employed automated fake accounts or ‘bots’ to amplify pro-government messages and overshadow pro-independence tweets.

Civil society and bottom-up social movements, such as the far-right Islamic Defenders Front [Front Pembela Islam, FPI], have also strengthened their presence on social media. Buzzers play a pivotal role in their campaigns, ensuring the wide circulation of messages from exiled FPI leader Rizieq Shihab by using multiple accounts to amplify FPI’s content, engaging with template comments and memes, and continually reuploading controversial content removed by platforms, expanding their reach to platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram (Seto, 2019). This group has had a considerable influence on Indonesian politics, impacting political elections and campaigns, as seen in the case of the 2017 Jakarta governor election and the 2019 Indonesian presidential elections (see Harkan & Irwansyah, 2019).

Understanding the historical use of social media by both the government and civil society for political contestation is crucial to comprehending the dynamics of the Omnibus Law protests and the relationship between the people, social media, and political activism.

Fighting and Selling The Omnibus Law

Law No. 11 of 2020 on Job Creation (Indonesia, 2020), passed in October 2020, aimed to streamline bureaucracy and encourage foreign investment. President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo sees it as a means to boost efficiency and reduce red tape in business permits and investment, yet has faced intense opposition (Ghaliya & Gorbiano, 2020). Critics, including labor unions and environmentalists, argue that it jeopardises labour rights and environmental protections (Ghaliya & Gorbiano, 2020). Social media campaigns and protests have expressed public discontent, using hashtags like #DPRRIKhianatiRakyat [House Betrays The People] and #BatalkanOmnibusLaw [Cancel Omnibus Law], deeming the law as favoring business interests over public welfare and has called for its cancellation (Ghaliya & Gorbiano, 2020). Contentious aspects of the law include replacing sectoral minimum wage with provincial rates and reducing maximum severance pay, where although having introduced an unemployment fund shared between employers and the government, concerns persist about its effectiveness in safeguarding workers facing termination (Ghaliya & Gorbiano, 2020). With nation-wide protests erupting, thousands of first-hand, amateur footage by activists and protesters show clashes and beatings by the police, prompting even more civil unrest (Lane, 2020). This section will explore how power and knowledge is exercised in the Indonesian digital space, and how both Indonesian civil society and the state negotiate power and action on social media in the context of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation.

Collective Action, Protests and Resistance

Various actors across civil society used social media to garner support and organise offline protest in opposition to the Omnibus Law, although the younger and tech-savvy demographic of university students were the primary mobilisers. Despite COVID-19-related measures limited on-campus activities, students were able to effectively coordinate demonstrations and form alliances with labour unions and other cornerstones of civil society by leveraging platforms like Twitter (Lane, 2020).

The dominance of anti-bill sentiment on Twitter by late September 2020 was largely due to the involvement of young ‘K-poppers’ and other netizens, illustrating the organic nature of the social media-driven resistance (Sastramidjaja & Rasidi, 2021). These young participants not only expanded the online resistance but also acquired political knowledge through the content they engaged with, preparing them for continued activism in the physical realm (Sastramidjaja & Rasidi, 2021). With discussions on social media primarily revolving around students, government, police, and civil society, Misran et al. (2023) echoes this sentiment on Twitter hashtag use and reach for social media resistance. #MahasiswaBergerak [Students Mobilise] stood out with a 46.07% reach among student-led discussions, followed by #CabutOmnibusLaw [Retract Omnibus Law] at 25% and  #RakyatBukanMusuhNegara [The People Are Not State Enemies] at 23.53% (Misran et al. 2023).

It is evident then how social media serves as a significant platform for discussions surrounding the Omnibus Law, playing a crucial role in amplifying these narratives, making the opposition to the law more visible and widespread, while providing insight into public sentiment.

Manipulation and State Control

Amidst rising public opposition and unrest, however, the government sought to delegitimise the protests on two fronts, as Fachriansyah (2020) discusses a leaked telegram from Indonesia’s National Police Chief: a) increase physical policing and intelligence at ‘strategic risk areas’—including factories, universities and city squares – to unroot ‘anarchist’ elements of the protests; and b) operate counter-narratives against issues that discredit the government by patrolling online discourse on social media and cyber-surveillance on activists.

The former is characterised as an offline-to-online issue. Although it remains unclear if the government was behind the ‘anarchist’ elements of the protest, the movement faced a significant setback when several major bus stops were vandalised and set on fire in Jakarta on October 8 (Sastramidjaja & Rasidi, 2021). These incidents, attributed to ‘anarchistic elements’ among the protesters by the media, led to a shift in public sentiment on social media, where despite having been the dominant space to rally public support ahead of the protests, suddenly witnessed widespread disapproval from the online public, who felt the destruction of public property was outrageous (Sastramidjaja & Rasidi, 2021).

An investigation by independent media outlet NarasiTV found that the unidentified individuals were behind the vandalism, yet this did little to combat media narratives that portrayed anarcho-syndicalists as the ‘mastermind’ behind these actions, echoing the authorities’ portrayal, despite previous revelations that such claims were fabricated (Sastramidjaja & Rasidi, 2021). As a result, the incident delegitimised the protest movement, discouraging ordinary law-abiding citizens – and the rest of the Indonesian digital public sphere – from identifying with the protests and any subsequent disapproving discourse with the Omnibus Law.

Supplying and flooding the digital space with counter-narratives and pro-government discourse then becomes the tasks of bots and buzzers. Pro-government actors, using both bots and buzzers, amplified negative narratives about the Omnibus Law protesters on social media, portraying them as ‘anarchic’ to echo the wave of mainstream media coverage, while also launching personal attacks against activists, which sets them apart from mainstream news (Sastramidjaja & Rasidi, 2021).

Buzzers not only portrayed activists as hypocrites by exposing them for endorsing products but also accused them of spreading hoaxes, which carried the threat of legal consequences, and used doxing to publicly reveal private information about the activists, contributing to the demoralisation of many and deterring the rest of the public sphere from discussing the Omnibus Law (Mufti & Rasidi, 2021).

Through a study interview with a key player in Indonesia’s buzzer industry, Mufti and Rasidi (2021) found that the government-organised concerted cyber-campaigns operate within a well-coordinated, hierarchical bureaucracy. In their social media strategy, buzzers use bots to tweet similar content at scheduled times whilte retweeting the main accounts to boost reach and and their curated narrative, creating the impression that such pro-government and anti-protest sentiment is an organic part of the Indonesian digital public sphere (Mufti & Rasidi, 2021). They also coordinate with other pro-Omnibus Law influencers and buzzer teams to avoid clashing narratives (Mufti & Rasidi, 2021). With financial compensation in mind, this competitive environment pushes buzzers to actively promote the Omnibus Law, as follower numbers and engagement directly impact how much they get paid (Mufti & Rasidi, 2021).

As Fadillah and Wibowo (2022) found – with the movement reaching its peak on October 5 at 500,000 tweets rejecting the Omnibus Law – the week following saw the gradual domination of pro-Omnibus Law tweets like #OmnibusLawBerkah [Omnibus Law a blessing] and #RakyatButuhUUCiptaKerja [People Need Omnibus Law], drowning out the remaining online resistance. The success of buzzers in herding public opinion by silencing and discrediting counter-government views in only a matter of days prompted Fadillah and Wibowo (2022, p. 28) to argue their new role as state “propaganda agents”, serving in a public relations-esque function.

The orchestrated online campaigns involving bots and buzzers served as effective tools in amplifying pro-government narratives, discrediting activists, and reshaping public opinion, ultimately positioning them as influential agents shaping public perception.

From Activist Haven to Hostility

The orchestrated delegitimisation strategy had an immediate impact on the protest, placing activists in a challenging position both offline and online. The online space, previously a domain ripe with activism, became hostile and contentious, leaving little room for activists to counter claims of illegitimacy. Simultaneously, increased police cybersurveillance led to the prosecution of activists and ordinary citizens under the often-criticised Electronic Information and Transaction Law (Sastramidjaja & Rasidi, 2021), with buzzers fueling the craze by fabricating and inflating hoax claims, which itself is considered a criminal offence and carries a maximum of 10 years in prison (Mufti & Rasidi, 2021). Social media transformed from an activist-friendly environment into an unsafe space, discouraging political criticism and stifling public expression. The government’s robust use of its cyber capabilities, exemplified by the National Police Chief’s telegram, demonstrates the strategic importance placed on the implementation of the Omnibus Law and the determination to suppress opposition. The government displayed an increasing ability to dominate the narrative, setting precedence for future efforts to enhance its capabilities for countering online dissent.

Discussion and Conclusion

Although shaped in an entirely different context and political climate, Foucault (1978) and Deleuze’s (1990) understanding of the intricate relationship between power and knowledge are not lost in the contemporary era surrounding Indonesia’s Omnibus Law protests. Hoskins’s (2014) assumption that social media platforms enable both offline and online protests while offering an alternative to conventional and sensationalist media is not entirely false, yet it clearly does not, however, provide a safe space for open discourse for the Indonesian public in protesting against the Omnibus Law. The Indonesian government, and the rest of its infiltrative cronies in the Indonesian digital public sphere, understand Foucault’s (1978) power/knowledge, making full use of buzzers and influencers to forcibly shape public opinion and to produce a new version of reality – one that villanises protesters and activists while pushing pro-government rhetoric. Flooding the digital space with such messages by state-affiliated actors echoes Andrejevic’s (2020) claims that information overload helps with disguising disinformation and information manipulation, creating an undemoractic digital public sphere. It is then right to question the efficacy of digital activism, which echoing Wolfson (2014) and Hassan and Sutherland (2016), social media’s affordances in facilitating public debate also opens avenues for state involvement, creating a facade of social progress.

The state’s illiberal actions in the digital space are not isolated. On one hand, the way the government wages a hidden war in reclaiming anti-government hashtags and flooding it with pro-government ones closely mirrors their attitude during the Free West Papua movement (Titifanue et al., 2020). On the other, buzzers, influencers, and microcelebrities have been the unsung heroes for the Indonesian government’s political campaigns for years. Seto (2019) and Harkan and Irwansyah (2019) have illustrated the power that Indonesian buzzers can command on social media platforms, shaping public perception and influencing the tide of political elections. Rakhmani and Permana (2020) and Sadasri (2020) have also shown how the government has outspokenly utilised microcelebrities and influencers to propagate and amplify government-aligned COVID-19 information and state directives. The state’s nation-wide scale of mobilising all of these key social media actors in light of the Omnibus Law protests, then, does not come as a surprise. Considering the government’s track record of disinformation and information manipulation, their handling of the Omnibus Law protests were to be expected, albeit not at this scale and efficiency.

The Indonesian government’s response to the Omnibus Law protests, leveraging a combination of online manipulation, surveillance, and delegitimisation, reflects the broader intersection of power, knowledge, and media in shaping public perception. This orchestrated strategy had an immediate and significant impact on both online and offline activism, transforming the digital space from an activist haven into one of hostility. The government’s adept use of bots, buzzers, and influencers exemplifies the blurred lines between politics, information manipulation, and media. This multifaceted approach, while not unique to the Omnibus Law protests, highlights the state’s extensive influence over the Indonesian digital public sphere, raising questions about the efficacy of digital activism and the future of open discourse in the face of state intervention and information overload. The government’s success in dominating the narrative serves as a precedent for future attempts to enhance its cyber capabilities for countering dissent.

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Originally submitted as coursework for the Master of Global Media Communication, University of Melbourne